Galaxy Digital has pledged up to $5 million in grants for open-source developers working on post-quantum cryptography tools for Bitcoin, marking one of the more direct funding efforts aimed at preparing the network for a future in which quantum computers could threaten today’s cryptographic protections.
The company is making the grants through its Bitcoin Quantum Readiness Initiative, a program designed to support research into safer migration paths for Bitcoin wallets, custodial systems, and protocol-level infrastructure. Galaxy has also created a quantum advisory council to guide the effort, bringing together specialists in quantum science, computer science, cryptography, and public policy.
The push comes as governments, technology companies, and cybersecurity researchers accelerate work on post-quantum standards. While there is no consensus on when a quantum computer powerful enough to break widely used cryptographic systems will become practical, the concern is serious enough that major institutions are beginning to prepare years in advance.
For Bitcoin, the issue is especially important because ownership depends on cryptographic keys. If future quantum machines can derive private keys from exposed public keys, coins held in older or poorly managed address types could become vulnerable. That risk is not immediate, but it is increasingly shaping research priorities across the digital asset sector.
Galaxy said its grants will support proposals focused on new signature schemes, tools for wallet and custodian migration, and formal security reviews of Bitcoin systems under post-quantum assumptions. The broader goal is to help developers test how Bitcoin could move away from today’s cryptographic methods before quantum computing reaches a dangerous level of capability.
Galaxy forms a quantum advisory council
Galaxy’s advisory council includes Barry Sanders, a professor and scientific director at Quantum City at the University of Calgary; Bérubé, an MIT Sea Grant Knauss fellow; and Eran Tromer, a computer science professor at Boston University. The group is expected to help evaluate research directions and support strategies for introducing quantum-resistant cryptography into the Bitcoin ecosystem.
Their work will center on one of the hardest questions facing Bitcoin developers: how to upgrade a global, decentralized monetary network without disrupting users, wallets, custodians, miners, node operators, and businesses that rely on existing standards.
Bitcoin currently uses cryptographic signature systems including ECDSA and Schnorr. These systems are considered secure against classical computers when implemented correctly. The threat model changes if large-scale quantum computers become capable of running algorithms that can solve the mathematical problems behind these signatures far faster than today’s machines.
That does not mean all Bitcoin would instantly be at risk. Many coins are protected behind hashed public keys until they are spent. But once a public key is revealed on-chain, a sufficiently advanced quantum machine could, in theory, attempt to calculate the corresponding private key. This is why address reuse, old wallet formats, and poor key-management practices are becoming central topics in post-quantum planning.
A large share of Bitcoin may need protection
Data from analytics provider Glassnode has shown that about 30% of Bitcoin’s total supply could face some level of exposure if practical quantum attacks become possible. The estimate includes roughly 10% of supply described as “structurally unsafe” and another 20% considered “operationally unsafe.”
The “structurally unsafe” category generally refers to coins held in formats where public keys are already visible or otherwise more directly exposed. The “operationally unsafe” category includes coins that may become vulnerable because of wallet behavior, especially address reuse or repeated spending patterns that reveal public keys on the public ledger.
These categories do not mean those coins are currently being stolen or that a quantum attack is available today. Instead, they highlight where the Bitcoin network could face pressure if the technology advances faster than expected. In that scenario, the most exposed coins could become the first targets.
The figures also show why preparation is complex. Bitcoin cannot be upgraded like a centralized database. A migration to quantum-resistant cryptography would require software changes, wallet changes, education for traders, coordination among developers, and adoption by service providers. In some cases, owners of old coins may need to move funds to new address types before a clear deadline emerges.
That process could take years, especially if new signature systems are larger, more expensive to verify, or harder to introduce without affecting Bitcoin’s limited block space.
Timeline remains disputed
The timing of the quantum threat remains one of the most debated parts of the issue. In November 2025, Blockstream chief executive Adam Back said Bitcoin was unlikely to face a practical quantum computing threat for at least 20 to 40 years. His view reflects a common argument among many cryptographers: today’s quantum machines remain far from the scale and reliability needed to break Bitcoin keys at meaningful speed.
Other analysts and cybersecurity specialists argue that migration planning should begin much earlier because large software transitions are slow. In an April report, wealth management firm Bernstein estimated that Bitcoin may have three to five years to begin moving toward quantum-resistant infrastructure. That view does not necessarily imply that a successful attack is imminent. Rather, it suggests that the network should start the planning phase well before the threat becomes urgent.
Both positions can be true in different ways. Practical quantum attacks may still be decades away, but building, testing, standardizing, and deploying new cryptographic systems across Bitcoin could also take a long time. If the network waits until the threat is visible, it may have too little time to respond safely.
That uncertainty is one reason funding programs such as Galaxy’s are gaining attention. The grants are intended to support early research, not emergency changes. The most likely near-term outcome is a wave of experiments, audits, and proposals that test how post-quantum signatures might work in Bitcoin without weakening other parts of the system.
U.S. standards add urgency to planning
The U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology, part of the Department of Commerce, finalized three post-quantum cryptography standards in August 2024. Those standards cover areas including key exchange, digital signatures, and hash-based algorithms, and they are expected to influence migration plans across banking, government, cloud computing, telecommunications, and digital assets.
The NIST standards matter because they provide tested reference points for organizations that need to begin replacing vulnerable systems. They also make it easier for software vendors and cybersecurity teams to align around common methods rather than creating separate, incompatible solutions.
For Bitcoin, however, adopting post-quantum cryptography is not as simple as choosing a government-approved algorithm. Bitcoin has unique constraints. Signature size, verification cost, network bandwidth, wallet compatibility, and long-term security assumptions all matter. Any replacement or supplement to ECDSA and Schnorr would need to fit within the network’s conservative upgrade culture.
In December 2025, Blockstream Research introduced a paper proposing a hash-based signature scheme intended as a potential replacement for Bitcoin’s current ECDSA and Schnorr systems. The research described a design that relies only on cryptographic hash functions, an approach that is widely viewed as promising in a post-quantum setting because secure hash functions are not known to be broken by quantum computers in the same way as today’s public-key signature systems.
Hash-based signatures bring trade-offs. They can be larger than current Bitcoin signatures and may require careful handling to avoid operational mistakes. That is why recent testing has focused not only on security but also on data efficiency.
Developers test smaller signature formats
In mid-July 2026, technology testers began examining new signature formats designed to use less data space for everyday network transactions. The goal is to reduce the heavy data burden that some post-quantum security designs could place on the Bitcoin ledger.
This work is important because Bitcoin block space is limited. If quantum-resistant signatures are too large, transaction fees could rise, wallet performance could suffer, and broad adoption could become more difficult. A practical solution must protect keys without making the network too costly or cumbersome to use.
Developers are therefore looking for designs that balance several needs at once: strong security against quantum attacks, manageable transaction size, fast verification, wallet usability, and a migration path that reduces confusion for ordinary users.
The challenge extends beyond code. Traders and service providers would need clear guidance on when to move coins, what address types to use, and how to avoid exposing public keys unnecessarily. Large custodians and central trading platforms would also need to rotate wallets carefully and prove that funds had been migrated without creating new operational risks.
Address reuse remains a near-term weakness
While quantum computers are the long-term concern, poor wallet habits are already visible on the public ledger. Reusing the same Bitcoin address can expose more information than necessary and may increase future risk if quantum attacks become practical.
A single-use address helps keep the public key hidden behind a cryptographic hash until the moment funds are spent. Once the funds move, best practice is to send remaining balances to a new address rather than repeatedly using the same one. This approach reduces the amount of time any public key remains exposed.
A May 2026 review estimated that central trading platforms hold about 1.66 million exposed coins because of weak wallet practices and repeated key exposure. A separate June 2026 paper estimated that roughly 7 million coins across all network users may be exposed in some form.
Those numbers do not imply an immediate theft risk under current technology. They do, however, show how much value could become attractive to future attackers if quantum computing develops faster than expected. The larger the pool of exposed coins, the stronger the incentive for attackers to build tools aimed at those balances.
For traders, the practical message from security specialists is straightforward: avoid address reuse, use modern wallet software, consider hardware wallets for long-term storage, and keep recovery materials secure. Moving coins without understanding wallet behavior can also create mistakes, so any migration should be done carefully and with tested tools.
Quantum funding race expands
The wider quantum computing sector is attracting growing amounts of capital and government support. A recent market forecast projected the global quantum sector at about $1.88 billion in 2026, with potential growth to $19.44 billion by 2035.
That expansion does not mean quantum computers capable of breaking Bitcoin are close. Much of the funding is aimed at scientific research, specialized computing, communications, sensing, and industrial applications. Still, the pace of spending is one reason cybersecurity agencies are urging organizations to prepare earlier rather than later.
Federal security expert Dustin Moody Regenscheid has noted in recent guidance that network operators should begin preparing systems for new cryptographic rules. The message from public-sector cybersecurity officials has been consistent: post-quantum migration should be treated as a long transition, not a last-minute patch.
This is especially relevant for systems with long-lived secrets. If data or keys exposed today could be attacked years from now, organizations must think beyond current computing limits. In Bitcoin’s case, the public ledger is permanent. Anything revealed on-chain remains available for future analysis.
Bitcoin faces a coordination test
The central challenge is not only technical. It is also social and economic. Bitcoin changes slowly by design, and any major cryptographic transition would require broad agreement among developers, miners, node operators, wallets, custodians, payment companies, and traders.
A rushed upgrade could introduce bugs or divide the network. A delayed upgrade could leave exposed coins vulnerable if quantum computing advances unexpectedly. The safest path is likely to involve years of research, testing, audits, and optional adoption before any major deadline is considered.
Galaxy’s $5 million grant commitment adds funding to that early-stage process. By supporting open-source developers, formal reviews, and migration tools, the initiative aims to widen the group of people working on the problem before it becomes urgent.
For now, Bitcoin’s quantum risk remains a future threat rather than a present crisis. But the direction of travel is clear. Governments have finalized standards, researchers are testing new signature systems, cybersecurity specialists are warning about long migration timelines, and digital asset firms are beginning to fund preparation.
The outcome will depend on whether the Bitcoin ecosystem can coordinate early enough to protect exposed keys while preserving the network’s core principles: decentralization, transparency, and resistance to forced change.
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