Project Eleven and Relm Insurance are developing a framework to test whether post-quantum security controls can be incorporated into the pricing and underwriting of digital asset insurance, moving a long-term cryptographic threat into the practical mechanics of custody risk assessment.
The partnership, announced Oct. 20, 2026, centers on Strongpoint, Project Eleven’s institutional custody product. The companies will examine whether insurers can assess indicators such as key exposure, signing architecture, transaction approvals, migration plans and external technology dependencies when evaluating a digital asset custody policy.
The work remains exploratory, and Relm said any future effect on underwriting decisions or premiums would be subject to its independent underwriting processes. Yet the project places quantum readiness alongside more familiar custody questions, including who can authorize transactions, how keys are secured and whether a provider can respond to a technical failure.
Testing quantum readiness as an insurance input
The companies are focusing on a scenario in which a quantum computer becomes powerful enough to derive a private key from a public key exposed on a blockchain. A private key controls the ability to move assets from an address; deriving it from public information would undermine the cryptographic assumptions that protect many existing wallet systems.
Insurance underwriters need evidence they can evaluate rather than broad statements that a firm is “quantum safe.” Project Eleven and Relm said their work will look at which technical records and operational controls could demonstrate that an institution has identified its exposure and can migrate to stronger cryptography if required.
That could include determining which wallet addresses have publicly exposed keys, how a custodian creates and signs transactions, whether its governance system can accommodate a new signature standard, and whether third-party technology vendors could slow a migration.
The proposed approach treats post-quantum readiness as a measurable feature of a custody program rather than a one-time software upgrade. A firm may use secure approval procedures today but face a different risk profile if those procedures are tied to cryptographic tools that cannot easily be replaced.
Strongpoint separates approval controls from signing algorithms
Strongpoint is designed to combine classical cryptography with post-quantum signing methods. Project Eleven said the platform separates institutional controls from the cryptographic layer used to sign transactions.
That division would allow an institution to replace or update a signing algorithm while retaining its existing transaction-approval rules, access controls and audit history. In custody operations, those surrounding controls often determine who can initiate, review and approve a transfer. Rebuilding them during a cryptographic migration could add operational risk precisely when a firm is trying to improve security.
Relm is expected to contribute to Strongpoint’s product design with particular attention to the custody features relevant to insurance risk assessment. The companies also plan to identify evidence that institutions could provide to insurers when seeking to show post-quantum preparedness.
The project therefore reaches beyond the question of whether a wallet supports a particular cryptographic algorithm. It examines whether an organization can document exposure, make changes without disrupting its governance structure and demonstrate that its service providers are prepared for the same transition.
Research has narrowed estimates of the quantum threat
Concerns over quantum computing stem from the potential ability of sufficiently capable machines to break certain public-key cryptography systems that are widely used across digital assets and the internet. The capability remains unavailable today, but the estimated resources needed to attack cryptographic systems have been subject to active research and changing assumptions about quantum hardware and error correction.
A research paper published by Google in March 2026 argued that an attacker could potentially need fewer than 500,000 physical qubits to carry out an attack against vulnerable cryptographic systems under its modeled assumptions. The estimate was far below figures commonly cited in earlier discussions, including projections near 20 million physical qubits seven years earlier.
Physical qubits are the individual components of quantum hardware. Practical quantum computing generally requires many physical qubits to create a smaller number of stable, error-corrected logical qubits capable of completing useful calculations. The gap between laboratory hardware and a cryptographically relevant machine remains substantial, though changing estimates have reinforced calls for systems to prepare before such a machine is built.
Google has also set a 2029 target to move its internal systems to quantum-safe security, according to the company. That timetable does not establish a deadline for a quantum attack on cryptocurrency networks, but it illustrates how major technology organizations are planning around the length and complexity of cryptographic migrations.
Custody providers face an operational migration challenge
For digital asset firms, the exposure is uneven. The primary concern applies where public keys are revealed in a way that could allow an attacker, with a capable enough quantum machine, to attempt to derive the corresponding private key. Address use, transaction design and wallet architecture can affect that exposure.
Project Eleven and Relm’s proposed assessment categories suggest insurers may eventually distinguish between firms that can identify such cases and firms relying on legacy infrastructure without a documented migration path. Key exposure alone would not capture the full risk: an institution also needs controls to approve migrations, validate new signing systems and maintain continuity across custodians, wallet software providers and other vendors.
Individual users and institutions may eventually receive post-quantum software upgrades from wallet and custody providers, but the security value of those upgrades will depend on implementation, address management and the underlying network’s support for new cryptographic standards. Claims that a wallet change can entirely eliminate quantum risk overlook those interdependencies.
Relm’s group includes Bermuda-domiciled specialty carrier Relm Insurance Ltd. and affiliated entities. The company, launched in 2019, said it operates across Bermuda, the United States, the United Kingdom and MENA and provides A-rated paper. Its collaboration with Project Eleven gives the custody sector an early test of whether quantum-security claims can be translated into documentation that insurers can use in real underwriting decisions.
For deeper context on security, storage, and custody, explore digital asset safety in our academy guide.
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