Lighter paused all withdrawals and new public-pool creation on Nov. 16 after roughly $15.5 million in USDC left the platform through two large withdrawals that on-chain analysts tied to a flaw in public-pool accounting and compromised access to two user accounts.
The platform said at 19:02 that it was investigating a security incident involving a single external party and had taken the restrictions as a precaution. The available transaction trail points away from a direct breach of Lighter's core protocol contracts and toward the interaction between its API-enabled internal transfers and a public-pool share mechanism.
The first withdrawal transferred 10,393,056.789298 USDC from a Lighter Ethereum contract to the address associated with the activity at 18:11:47. A second withdrawal request, for about 5.1 million USDC, followed less than 20 minutes later. Together, the two outflows totaled about $15.49 million.
The incident immediately hit LIT, Lighter's token. Minute-level perpetual-market data showed LITUSDT opening at $2.725 at 18:29, then falling to $2.3218 by 18:34, a decline of roughly 14.8% within minutes. Earlier monitoring had put the token's initial move at about 8% as the first withdrawal gained attention.
A public-pool share imbalance
On-chain investigator MLM first flagged a 10.39 million USDC withdrawal and tracked the funds as they were swapped into ETH and dispersed across several addresses. The transaction sequence led to a wallet ending in 0xb3ff, associated with Lighter account #769455.
Preparation began several hours before the major withdrawal. At 14:47:23, the address swapped ETH for 29.959999 USDC through Relay and deposited the stablecoin to Lighter. Around 16:45, it received roughly 10,500 USDC through a cross-chain transfer, then deposited 10,200 USDC to the platform at 17:35.
Five minutes later, Lighter account 714710 created a public pool with zero fees. The suspected attacker contributed 9,999 USDC and acquired 99.99% of the pool shares, while the affected account acquired shares with a 1 USDC purchase.
The sequence exploited different permissions available to pool participants. According to the reconstruction, a pool creator could move funds internally through an API without providing an additional signature. Other pool participants could buy shares and redeem a proportional claim on the pool's assets.
When the affected account transferred funds into the pool through the internal-transfer route, those deposits apparently did not generate corresponding new pool shares. The attacker's near-total ownership of the existing shares therefore gave it a claim over assets entering the pool through that path.
At 17:44:13, the affected account sent 1 USDC through an internal transfer, apparently as a test. Within three seconds, the attacker redeemed 9,999.9999 USDC. The attacker then used the returned funds to repeat and expand the process.
At 17:45, the affected account made ten internal transfers of 1 million USDC each, followed by another transfer of approximately 384,000 USDC. At 17:45:38, the attacker redeemed roughly 10.393 million USDC and submitted the withdrawal request to Ethereum mainnet.
A second account was hit minutes later
After the first withdrawal completed, the same actor deposited another 10,200 USDC into Lighter and used the same pool structure against account 714723.
A second public pool was created at 18:25, again with the 1 USDC versus 9,999 USDC setup. Another small internal transfer and redemption followed, mirroring the first cycle. At 18:27, five separate transfers of 1 million USDC, plus a remaining amount, entered the pool. The second withdrawal request, for about 5.097 million USDC, was submitted at 18:28:45.
MLM said it observed the outflow at 18:29 through Telegram monitoring. The timing closely matched the sharp decline in LIT's perpetual market, where traders reacted before Lighter's public statement was issued at 19:02.
The incident places scrutiny on permissions granted to API-connected accounts, particularly where those permissions can initiate internal balance movements without a fresh signature. A transfer function may appear operationally routine, but when it feeds an asset pool whose ownership is determined by a separate share ledger, the treatment of deposits becomes central to the security model.
In this case, the attacker did not need to drain a protocol contract through an apparent code vulnerability. The reconstruction instead describes the use of authorized account-level actions to place funds into a pool without increasing the share supply, allowing existing shares to capture the newly transferred assets.
Funds moved through ETH, Arbitrum and Hyperliquid
After receiving the first mainnet withdrawal, the attacker used six transactions to exchange approximately 10.383 million USDC for 5,764.47 ETH, based on the on-chain analysis. The ETH was then divided into transfers of 160 ETH.
One receiving address, beginning 0x63d09, obtained 160 ETH at 18:19:59. Less than two minutes later, it used LiFi through LayerSwap to bridge funds. At 18:37, that address received 287,557.5548 USDC on Arbitrum, then sent the exact amount to Hyperliquid's deposit bridge at 18:39.
Once the funds reached Hyperliquid's spot market, the address bought 552 units of XMR1, according to the tracking analysis. Other addresses appeared to follow a similar route: ETH moved from Ethereum, was bridged into USDC on Arbitrum, then sent into Hyperliquid for XMR1 purchases.
The use of several intermediate addresses and cross-chain transfers can complicate tracing, though the transactions remain visible on public ledgers. The exact role of XMR1 in the broader fund movement was not established by the supplied on-chain reconstruction.
Abraxas connection remains limited to an on-chain data point
One affected Lighter account, 714710, was associated with an Ethereum address beginning 0x0d1D. Analysts cited an Arbitrum transaction as a possible connection to Abraxas Capital activity: on Feb. 16, a Hyperliquid wallet previously labeled as linked to Abraxas, 0xb83de, sent 0.1 ETH to the address for gas.
That transfer alone does not establish responsibility for the Nov. 16 incident. It identifies a transaction relationship involving an address that analysts had associated with Abraxas, a London-founded investment firm that entered digital assets in 2017 and launched its Elysium Global Arbitrage Fund in 2018.
Lighter's immediate withdrawal halt limited the risk of additional withdrawals through the same path. Its next operational challenge will be determining how the affected accounts obtained or used API permissions, while revising pool controls so internal transfers cannot increase a pool's assets without an equivalent change in the share accounting that determines redemption rights.
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